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3.1 Introduction
The Paris Agreement aims to limit global average temperature 
increase to well below 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels 
and to pursue efforts to further limit it to 1.5°C. In 2015, 
almost all countries submitted national climate action 
plans and commitments for 2025 or 2030: their Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). These form 
the foundation of the Paris Agreement, which entered into 
force on 4 November 2016. For the 168 countries that have 
to date (24 October 2017) ratified this Agreement, the INDCs 
have become Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). 
This chapter provides an update on the mitigation challenge 
associated with the global temperature goal of the Paris 
Agreement, and the estimated global emission levels under 
various assumptions regarding the implementation of 
current policies and NDCs or INDCs (hereafter referred to as 
NDCs, unless specifically mentioned in relation to a country 
that has not ratified the Paris Agreement) (section 3.2 and 
3.3). It also assesses the additional impact of the Kigali 
Amendment and the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) Agreement (section 3.3), before further exploring the 
projected impact up to 2030 of the current policies and NDCs 
on emissions for each G20 member and considering how the 
ambition of NDCs can be compared across countries (section 
3.4). Finally, the chapter provides an update on recent 
estimates of emission reduction potentials by subnational 
and non-state actor action (section 3.5).
3.2 Scenarios considered in the emissions gap 
assessment
3.2.1 Overview of scenarios
In line with the 2016 Emissions Gap Report, the assessment 
of the emissions gap draws on six scenarios (Rogelj et al., 
2016). These comprise: 
• Two reference scenarios: 
- No-policy baseline scenario, which projects global 
greenhouse gas emissions based on the assumption 
that no new climate policies are put into place from 
2005 onwards.
- Current policy scenario, which provides best estimates 
of future global emissions taking all currently adopted 
and implemented policies1 into account, but assuming 
that no additional mitigation action is taken beyond 
these policies.
• Two NDC scenarios2: 
- Unconditional NDC scenario, where Parties with NDCs 
are assumed to implement only the portions of their 
targets that are without conditions, while Parties that 
solely have a conditional target are assumed to follow 
a current policy scenario.
- Conditional NDC scenario, where all Parties with NDCs 
in addition to their unconditional targets are assumed 
to implement their conditional targets, and Parties 
that only have an unconditional target are assumed to 
implement that target. 
• Two scenarios that limit global warming to below 2°C 
and 1.5°C, respectively: 
- 2°C scenario, which is based on global emission 
scenarios that assume limited action until 2020 and 
least-cost emission reduction pathways from 2020, 
and are consistent with a greater than 66 percent 
 
1 These are defined as legislative decisions, executive orders, or their 
equivalent.
2 In both the unconditional and conditional NDC cases, it is assumed that for 
any traded international offsets, each unit is counted towards the NDC of a 
single country only – either the buyer or the seller – to avoid issues of double 
counting.
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chance of limiting global warming in 2100 to below 2°C 
above pre-industrial levels.
- 1.5°C scenario, which is based on global emission 
scenarios that assume limited action until 2020 and 
least-cost emission reduction pathways from 2020, 
and are consistent with a 50-66 percent chance of 
limiting global warming in 2100 to below 1.5°C above 
pre-industrial levels. 
The assessment draws on multiple individual scenarios 
from the published literature. Each scenario is global in 
scope, reflecting possible actions by all countries (for further 
details, see Appendix A, available online). It should be noted 
that the two NDC scenarios assume full implementation of 
the conditional and unconditional NDCs for all countries, 
including the United States of America, as the NDC of the 
United States of America has not yet been officially repealed. 
Section 3.3 discusses the impact of a possible withdrawal of 
the United States of America from the Paris Agreement.
In line with the 2016 Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2016) 
and as indicated above, the 2017 assessment mainly draws 
on 1.5°C scenarios that assume least-cost pathways starting 
from 2020 and return global warming to below 1.5°C in 
2100 with a lower (50–66 percent) probability than for 
the 2°C scenarios (greater than 66 percent probability) 
(see box 3.1 for additional information about these 
scenarios). New studies are emerging that provide least-
cost pathways from 2020 consistent with a greater than 
66 percent chance of limiting global warming in 2100 to 
below 1.5°C. The preliminary findings of these new studies 
and their implications for the 2030 global emission levels 
are summarized in section 3.2.3. More studies are under 
way and will be fully integrated into the gap assessment 
next year, as current estimates may still change during the 
review process of the studies. Box 3.1 provides a discussion 
of the extent to which the 1.5°C and 2°C least-cost pathways 
are informed by the growing damages that increasingly are 
being attributed to early impacts of climate change.
Table 3.1 provides an overview of the projected global 
emission estimates under the six scenarios considered for 
the assessment in this report, showing the median global 
emission levels for 2025 and 2030 — the years countries use 
in their NDCs. 
Box 3.1 How are recent extreme events reflected in the 1.5°C and 2°C pathways used in the 
Emissions Gap Report? 
With drought in Africa, floods in South Asia and repeated hurricanes in the Caribbean, 2017 will probably prove to have 
been a record year for the human, social and economic cost of extreme weather events. Although it would be a mistake 
to attribute all extreme weather events to the impact of climate change, there is growing evidence that climate change 
may be contributing to the their increasing frequency and severity.
It would be logical to think that the damage caused by climate change should affect the least-cost pathways that are at 
the core of the analysis in this report: the earlier and more severe the damage, the stronger the case for early action to 
reduce emissions.
Some models, such as the Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy (DICE) model, do indeed incorporate damage functions 
(Nordhaus, 2017). These are a subset of Integrated Assessment Models that combine physical and economic elements 
and are termed ‘cost-benefit Integrated Assessment Models’. These cost-benefit studies monetize the impacts of climate 
change and then balance the economic implications of mitigation and climate damages to identify the optimal trajectory 
of emissions reductions that will maximize total welfare (see box 6.1 in Clarke et al., 2014). However, since by design 
such scenarios do not achieve a specific climate goal, they are less directly useful as a benchmark to assess pathways 
towards achieving the long-term temperature goal set in Paris.
For this reason, the Emissions Gap Report makes use of a different class of Integrated Assessment Models, termed ‘cost-
effectiveness’ models (see Weyant (2017) for a discussion of all types of Integrated Assessment Models). These models 
distribute the emission reductions across regions, sectors and gases in such a way that the global discounted reduction 
costs are minimized over time, and the climate target is achieved ( Rogelj et al., 2016; Clarke et al., 2014). In practice, the 
Emissions Gap Report selects pathways that aim to limit global mean temperature increase to either 1.5°C or 2°C relative 
to pre-industrial levels, with varying levels of probability. This means that, unless decision makers decide to make the 
global climate target even more ambitious, the benchmark pathways used in the Emissions Gap Report will not change 
in response to the impact of extreme weather events.
It does not follow that decision makers can ignore the impact of extreme weather. The events of 2017 reinforce the case 
for early and sustained action to reduce emissions.
13The Emissions Gap Report 2017 – The emissions gap and its implications
Box 3.2 The impact of uncertainties  
Additional research is necessary, as the uncertainty ranges overlap for many countries and since the number of studies 
available for the current policy trajectory case and the NDC cases vary significantly. A recent study (Rogelj et al., 2017a) 
explores six dimensions that contribute to uncertainties in the assessment of emissions outcomes of NDCs. These 
comprise (i) variations in overall socioeconomic conditions, such as Gross Domestic Product and population growth, 
(ii) uncertainties in historical emission inventories, (iii) the conditionality of certain NDCs, (iv) the definition of NDC targets 
as ranges instead of single values, (v) the way in which renewable energy targets are expressed, and (vi) the way in which 
traditional biomass use is accounted for, as renewable energy or otherwise. They find that depending on assumptions in 
these six dimensions, NDC estimates can range from 47 to 63 GtCO
2
e/year in 2030, which is a wider range than the 50 
to 56 GtCO
2
e/year combined unconditional and conditional NDC scenario range of this report (table 3.1). Uncertainties 
in socioeconomic developments are the dominant driver, accounting for more than half of the uncertainty, followed 
by uncertainties in the way renewable energy targets are expressed. These uncertainties are not fully accounted for in 
the range of this study, as this is based on the central estimates of all studies that individually make implicit or explicit 
assumptions on the above-mentioned uncertainties. 
Another issue is the accounting of land-use-related mitigation, which has been identified as an important source of 
uncertainty (Forsell et al., 2016; Grassi et al., 2017; Rogelj et al., 2016), but is not explored explicitly in Rogelj et al. 
(2017a). Grassi et al. (2017) find a current ±3 GtCO
2
e/year difference in global LULUCF net emissions between country 
reports (data submitted to UNFCCC, such as greenhouse gas inventories and national communications) and scientific 
studies (as reflected in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports). Among the many possible reasons 
for these differences, Grassi et al. suggest that a key factor, which deserves further analysis, relates to what is considered 
‘anthropogenic sink’.
Finally, there is some additional uncertainty around the impact of Global Warming Potentials. There is no consistency in 
the historical data and the future projections across the studies in the use of Global Warming Potentials. Some studies 
use the Global Warming Potentials from the IPCC Second Assessment Report (AR2) consistently for all countries, whereas 
others use the Global Warming Potentials from the IPCC Fourth and Fifth Assessment Reports (AR4 and AR5), depending 
on the NDC information. With regard to the magnitude of uncertainty related to the choice of Global Warming Potentials, 
global total greenhouse gas emissions for 2014 are reported to be 3 percent higher when the IPCC Fourth Assessment 
Report (AR4) Global Warming Potentials are used, compared to when the IPCC Second Assessment Report (AR2) Global 
Warming Potentials are used (Gütschow et al., 2017). The difference can be larger at a country level when, for example, 
the share of Methane (CH
4
) emissions in total greenhouse gas emissions of a country is larger than the global average. 
Emissions estimates (GtCO2e/year) (rounded to the nearest gigatonne)
Scenario Global total emissions in 2025 Global total emissions in 2030 Number of scenarios in set
No-policy baseline 61.0 (56.7–64.3) 64.7 (59.5–69.5) 179
Current policy trajectory 55.4 (53.5–56.8) 58.9 (57.6–60.7) 4
Unconditional NDCs 53.8 (50.6–55.3) 55.2 (51.9–56.2) 10
Conditional NDCsa 52.2 (49.3–54.0) 52.8 (49.5–54.2) 10 (6+4)
2°C pathways (more than 66% chance 2°C, 
least-cost from 2020)b 
47.7 (46.2–50.2) 41.8 (30.6–43.5) 10
1.5°C pathways  
(50- 66% chance 1.5°C, least-cost from 
2020)c 
44.5 (43.1–45.5)d 36.5 (32–37.7)d,e 6
Note: 
Ranges are computed as described in Rogelj et al. (2016). In cases where estimates are based on less than 10 scenarios, the minimum-maximum range is provided. The 
row of “Conditional NDCs” is only provided for information, as a direct comparison with the “Unconditional NDCs” ranges is not possible, due to arbitrary model sampling 
differences. The emissions range for 1.5°C is smaller than for 2oC, as fewer studies for 1.5°C are available. Source: adjusted from Rogelj et al. (2016).
a  Assuming full implementation of both unconditional and conditional NDCs. Six studies provided an estimate for the conditional NDC case. The median estimate of 
influence derived from these six studies is used to adjust the unconditional NDC estimate of the four remaining studies that did not include conditional NDC estimates. 
The estimated improvement of moving from the unconditional to the conditional case is in the range of 2.4 (1.2–3.0 GtCO2e/year, full range).
b  As in UNEP (2015): greater than 66 percent probability of limiting global average temperature increase to below 2°C in 2100 (probabilities never drop below 60 percent 
during the entire century).
c  As in UNEP (2016): 50 percent to 66 percent probability of limiting global average temperature increase to below 1.5°C in 2100 (allowing median global average 
temperature to temporarily exceed the 1.5°C limit before 2100). 
d These numbers have been harmonized to the same 2010 emissions levels as the 2°C pathways. 
e  Forthcoming peer-reviewed research indicates that this median value is broadly consistent with results for scenarios that assume a middle-of-the-road future socio-
economic development (cf. SSP2 Fricko et al., 2017). At the same time, recent research suggests that the ranges, however, could be extended further at the lower end 
(Rogelj et al., 2017a), that is 32-34 GtCO
2
e/year.
Table 3.1: Global total greenhouse gas emissions in 2025 and 2030 under different scenarios (median and 10th to 90th percentile range). 
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The studies from which the current policy trajectory 
scenario and the NDC scenario are drawn differ in a number 
of respects, such as their treatment of conditional versus 
unconditional NDCs; assumptions regarding non-covered 
sectors and gases; treatment of land use, land-use change 
and forestry (LULUCF) and surplus emission units; different 
bases for calculating Global Warming Potentials. These 
differences are further described in the 2016 Emissions 
Gap Report, which also provides a fuller discussion of the 
six scenarios. The methodological differences between the 
studies cannot be fully harmonized, which leads to some 
uncertainty as indicated in the results presented in section 
3.3, where the implications of the differences between 
studies are also further explored (see also box 3.2).
3.2.2 Updates to the assessment 
The emissions estimates presented in table 3.1 are based on 
the 2016 Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2016), but updates 
have been made in a number of cases. 
There are no updates to the no-policy baseline scenario 
compared to the 2016 report. However, the current policies 
projections at the global level have been updated, drawing 
on data from the Climate Action Tracker (CAT, 2017), the 
Joint Research Centre (Kitous et al., 2017), PBL Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency (den Elzen et al., 2016a; 
Kuramochi et al., 2016; PBL, 2017), and the International 
Energy Agency (IEA, 2016). 
The global emissions projections of the two NDC scenarios 
have also been updated with data from the four above-
mentioned modelling studies, and with updated data from 
Climate Interactive (2017). 
The estimates for the 2°C pathways with higher than 
66 percent probability in 2100 remain unchanged since the 
2016 Emissions Gap Report. 
The estimates for the 1.5°C pathways with 50-66 percent 
probability in 2100 have been updated, resulting in 2030 
global emission estimates that are around 3 GtCO
2
e lower 
than those in the 2016 Emissions Gap Report. The update 
is based on: (a) the inclusion of new data that have become 
available from scenarios generated with updated or other 
modelling frameworks, and (b) the harmonization of the 
1.5°C pathways with the same global 2010 emissions as 
for the 2°C pathways. The new data considered lower the 
2030 emission estimates by around 1 GtCO
2
e and have also 
expanded the emissions range. Under the assumption of 
continued historical socioeconomic trends, Rogelj et al. (2017a) 
find emissions in 2030 in the range of 35-37 GtCO
2
e/year, 
whereas when assuming enhanced efforts to limit energy 
demand and a shift towards sustainable consumption 
patterns, cost-optimal emission levels in 2030 are estimated 
at 32-34 GtCO
2
e/year.
The harmonization has been undertaken to resolve a 
discrepancy between the global emissions in 2010 of the 
1.5°C pathways and the 2°C pathways3. More specifically, 
the global emissions in 2010 of the 1.5°C pathways included 
in the 2016 Emissions Gap Report were about 3 GtCO
2
e 
higher than the median 2010 levels of the 2°C pathways. 
This resulted in higher global emissions by 2020 for the 1.5°C 
pathways compared to the 2°C pathways. The harmonization 
brings the 2010 global emission estimates to the same 
level for the assessed 1.5°C pathways and 2°C pathways, 
and leads to comparable 2020 emission levels for the two 
pathways. This harmonization further affects the projected 
global emission levels in 2030, lowering them by around 
a further 2 GtCO
2
e. The estimated global emission level is 
about 5 GtCO
2
e lower than the central estimate for the 2°C 
pathways, as shown in table 3.1. 
 
3.2.3 Emerging studies on pathways with a 
greater than 66 percent chance of limiting 
global warming to below 1.5°C
The strengthened temperature targets of the Paris 
Agreement and the forthcoming 2018 Special Report on 
the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial 
levels and related global greenhouse gas emissions pathways 
by the IPCC have generated substantial interest in scenarios 
that assume least-cost pathways starting from 2020 and that 
have a higher than 66 percent probability of returning global 
warming to 1.5°C in 2100. 
For the 2016 Emissions Gap Report, no such scenarios were 
available. Therefore the report focused on the least-cost 
pathways starting from 2020 that had a lower probability 
(50 percent) of returning global warming to below 1.5°C in 
2100, based on a review by Rogelj et al. (2015) of earlier 
published scenarios (Luderer et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 
2013a; Rogelj et al., 2013b). 
However, new scenarios are now emerging that assume 
least-cost pathways starting from 2020 that can return 
global warming to below 1.5°C in 2100 with at least 
66 percent probability. These are reported in the ADVANCE 
project’s policy briefs (Luderer et al., 2016; Vrontisi et al., 
2016) and its forthcoming paper (Vrontisi et al., 2017). At 
the ninth meeting of the research dialogue at the Subsidiary 
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) in Bonn, 
May 2017, Rogelj et al. (2017b) also presented the first draft 
of least-cost 1.5°C pathways starting from 2020 based on a 
multi-model comparison study and the framework of the 
Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (Riahi et al., 2017)4.
These higher probability 1.5°C scenarios have extensive 
implications for 2030 global emission levels. Vrontisi et al. 
(2016) reported scenarios from various models that assume 
least-cost pathways starting from 2020 that can return global 
warming to below 1.5°C in 2100 with at least 66 percent 
probability. Emission levels in 2030 for 1.5°C scenarios are 
estimated at 24 (range: 19–34) GtCO
2
e, which is about 
3 The harmonization is based on the average outcome of adopting the three 
harmonization methods from the literature (Rogelj et al., 2011).
4 These scenarios represent an extension of the set of ‘Representative 
Concentration Pathways’ (RCPs) towards scenarios that limit end-of-century 
forcing to 1.9 W/m2.
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18 GtCO
2
e lower than the central estimate for the 2°C 
pathways (table 3.1).
3.3 The emissions gap in 2030 and urgency of 
action
This section updates the 2030 emissions gap from previous 
reports (section 3.3.1) and examines the implications of the 
estimated emission levels associated with the NDC scenarios 
for peaking of emissions, depletion of the carbon budget 
and global average temperature increase by the end of 
the century (section 3.3.2). It then assesses the potential 
positive effects on the 2030 emissions gap of two important 
agreements outside the UNFCCC: the Kigali Amendment and 
the International Civil Aviation Organization Agreement.
3.3.1 The effect of NDCs on global greenhouse gas 
emissions and the resulting emissions gap
This section presents the emissions gap for 2030, drawing 
on the estimated global total greenhouse gas emission levels 
in 2030 under the six scenarios described in section 3.2 and 
provided in table 3.1. As in previous reports, the emissions 
gap in 2030 is defined as the difference between global total 
greenhouse gas emissions from least-cost scenarios that are 
consistent with the below 2°C and 1.5°C temperature target 
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Figure 3.1: Global greenhouse gas emissions under different scenarios and the emissions gap in 2030 (median estimate and 10th to 90th 
percentile range).  
Note: the emissions range for 1.5°C is smaller than for 2°C, as a smaller 
number of studies for 1.5°C are available. For current policy, the minimum–
maximum across all assessed studies are provided.
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and the expected global total greenhouse gas emissions 
implied if NDCs are fully implemented. Findings regarding 
the aggregate effect of full implementation of the NDCs on 
global total greenhouse gas emissions in 2025 and 2030 are 
also compared to the emissions implied by the no-policy 
baseline scenario and the current policy scenario. 
The results are illustrated in figure 3.1, which shows that the 
emissions gap in 2030, compared with least-cost pathways 
limiting global warming to below 2°C with a greater than 
66 percent chance, ranges from 11-13.5 GtCO
2
e for the full 
implementation of the conditional and the unconditional 
NDCs respectively. These estimates are slightly lower 
than those made in 2016 (12-14 GtCO
2
e), due to updated 
information from five global studies resulting in lower 
emission projections for the NDCs. The emissions gap in 
the case of least-cost pathways limiting global warming to 
below 1.5°C with 50–66 percent chance is 16-19 GtCO
2
e 
for conditional and unconditional NDCs respectively. This is 
higher than the estimates made in 2016 (15-17 GtCO
2
e) due 
to the updated 1.5°C pathways (see section 3.2). As indicated 
by the emerging new studies, the gap would be significantly 
larger if a higher probability (>66 percent) of limiting global 
temperature increase to 1.5°C in 2100 was considered.
It is apparent from figure 3.1 that current policies lead 
to emissions that are markedly lower than the baseline, 
which assumes that no additional climate policies are put 
in place from 2005. This indicates that the baseline will 
become increasingly less useful as a reference case. The 
current policies projections have lowered by about 1 GtCO
2
e 
compared with the estimate made in 2016, mainly due to 
lower current policy projections from China.
Figure 3.1 shows that full implementation of the 
unconditional NDCs will reduce annual global greenhouse 
gas emissions in 2030 by 9 GtCO
2
e5 (range: 8–13) relative to 
the median no-policy baseline, and by 4 GtCO
2
e (range: 2–7) 
relative to the median current policy trajectory. Comparing 
these cost-optimal 2°C and 1.5°C scenarios with the 
unconditional NDC projections shows a large discrepancy. 
More specifically, there is a gap in 2030 of 13.5 GtCO
2
e 
(range: 10–15) between the unconditional NDC scenario 
and the median 2°C scenario. Comparing the unconditional 
NDC scenario with the median global emissions pathway 
consistent with meeting 1.5°C with a 50–66 percent chance 
leads to a gap of 19 GtCO
2
e (range: 15-21), which is 2 GtCO
2
e 
higher than the gap in the 2016 report, due to the lower 
1.5°C emissions pathways. 
In comparison, if countries were to also fully implement 
the conditional NDCs, estimated global greenhouse gas 
emissions would be about 2.4 GtCO
2
e (range: 1.2–3.0) lower 
in 2030 compared with the unconditional NDC scenario 
case. This leaves a gap in 2030 of 11 (range 8–12) GtCO
2
e 
5 The gap numbers and ranges in the text are rounded to the nearest Gt.
between the conditional NDC scenario and the median 
cost-optimal 2°C scenario. Comparing the conditional NDC 
scenario with the median 1.5°C scenarios (50–66 percent 
chance) increases the gap to 16 GtCO
2
e (range: 13–18). 
It should be noted that the two NDC scenarios assume full 
implementation of the conditional and unconditional NDCs 
submitted by all countries. Considering the announcement 
of the United States of America regarding its withdrawal 
from the Paris Agreement and  policy changes in the United 
States of America, section 3.4 also discusses recent studies 
estimating possible effects on the United States of America’s 
emissions.
The gap calculations assume that there is no double counting 
of reductions. In other words, transferred reductions are 
only counted towards the achievement of one country’s 
NDC, not towards both the country buying and selling. The 
Paris Agreement provides for voluntary use of “international 
transferred mitigation outcomes”, such as trading of offset 
credits, on the basis that parties shall avoid double counting. 
If, in a theoretical scenario, all Parties were to freely double 
count (contrary to the provisions of the Paris Agreement), 
this could increase the global emissions by 2030 by 
0.8 GtCO
2
e in the case of both unconditional and conditional 
NDCs6. 
3.3.2 The implications on peaking, carbon budget 
and temperature 
Global total greenhouse gas emissions (covering all sectors 
and gases) are expected to increase and not peak before 
2030 under both the NDC scenarios and the current policy 
scenario. New actions would be necessary to change this. 
In contrast, the 2°C and 1.5°C least-cost pathways assume 
that global total greenhouse gas emissions peak no later 
than in 2020. This stresses the urgency of strengthening 
mitigation action as well as NDCs before 2020, as Chapter 2 
also concludes.
Another indication of the urgency of action concerns the 
implications of projected global total CO
2
 emissions for 
the carbon dioxide (CO
2
) budget. The CO
2
 budget indicates 
the total cumulative CO
2
 emissions that can be emitted for 
temperatures to stay below 2°C and 1.5°C7. If the NDCs are 
fully implemented, they will result in cumulative emissions of 
750-800 GtCO
2
 during the 2011–2030 period, which is about 
80 percent of the remaining CO
2
 budget of 1,000 GtCO
2
 
(range: 750-1,400) for limiting global warming to below 2°C 
with more than 66 percent probability. The available global 
carbon budget for 1.5°C with 50-66 percent probability will 
already be well depleted by 2030. A recently published paper 
(Millar et al., 2017) suggests that the available budget for 1.5°C 
6 Consistent with the earlier analysis of double counting in the UN Environment 
2014 Emissions Gap Report, for the NDC cases it is assumed that international 
emission offsets could account for 33 percent of the difference between 
current policies trajectory and emission levels for the NDC cases by 2030 
for the OECD countries. This is an arbitrary, conservative estimate, as many 
parties have yet to specify any limits on the use of transferable units.
7 Box 2-1 (UNEP, 2014) explains how cumulative CO
2
 emissions are influenced 
by various factors, such as the transient climate response to cumulative 
carbon emissions and non-CO
2
 greenhouse gases.
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2
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(IPCC, 2014a). The carbon budget ranges show the values based on the range of scenarios assessed by Working Group 
III (IPCC, 2014b). The solid horizontal line at 1,000 GtCO
2
 shows the estimate based on complex Earth-System Models, 
assessed by Working Group I (IPCC, 2014a). Historical emissions until 2015 are based on Le Quéré et al. (2015).
Figure 3.2: Comparison of projected emissions by 2030 and all-time 1.5°C and 2°C 
carbon budgets.  
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might be bigger. However, criticism on the  study points to 
the fact that using different global average temperature data 
sets in the calculations would not lead to higher budgets8. 
Finally, the urgency of action and enhanced ambition 
becomes unquestionable when the global average 
temperature implications of the NDCs are taken into 
consideration. Estimates of the level of global average 
temperature increase associated with the implementation 
of the NDCs depend on the assumptions made about what 
will happen after 2030, and the probability assigned to the 
global average temperature increase. Previous Emissions 
Gap Reports adopt the approach of Rogelj et al. (2016), 
which assumes that, as a minimum, the level of climate 
mitigation effort implied by the NDCs is continued after 
2030, until the end of the century. As reported in the 2016 
Emissions Gap Report, full implementation of unconditional 
NDCs and comparable action afterwards is consistent with a 
global average temperature increase of about 3.2°C (median, 
range: 2.9–3.4°C) relative to pre-industrial levels with greater 
than 66 percent probability by 2100. Full implementation of 
the conditional NDCs would lower the projection by about 
0.2°C by 2100.
3.3.3 Impact of the Kigali Amendment
The Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol aims to phase 
down production and imports of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), 
thereby reducing hydrofluorocarbon emissions, which is 
in the spirit of the Paris Agreement to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions to net zero. It solidifies the international 
efforts and provides more certainty that national measures 
to reduce these emissions will be implemented. Against a 
no-action baseline, the reductions could be in the order of 
0.7 GtCO
2
e/year in 2030 (Höglund-Isaksson et al., 2017). 
The Kigali Amendment may have a lower additional impact 
against the NDCs, but one that is uncertain as countries are 
not clear about the extent to which such reductions are 
already covered by the NDCs. Most countries set targets 
for all greenhouse gases including the hydrofluorocarbons. 
For them, implementing the commitments of the 
Kigali Amendment will not necessarily lead to lower 
hydrofluorocarbon emissions than implementing the 
NDC. Some, most notably China, have not included these 
emissions in their NDC. For them, the implementation of 
the Kigali Amendment would lead to lower emissions than 
implementing the NDC and would, therefore, narrow the 
emissions gap. 
The long-term impact of the Kigali Amendment is assessed in 
Chapter 6, which shows that it can be substantial. 
8 https://www.carbonbrief.org/factcheck-climate-models-have-not-exag- 
gerated-global-warming ; http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2017/ 
09/is-there-really-still-a-chance-for-staying-below-1-5-c-global-warming/
3.3.4 Impact of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization Agreement
The International Civil Aviation Organization is the United 
Nations body responsible for international civil aviation 
emissions of CO
2
 under Article 2.2 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Although international aviation is not explicitly identified 
under the Paris Agreement, it is assumed that the 
International Civil Aviation Organization will continue to take 
responsibility for international emissions.
 
The International Civil Aviation Organization adopted a target 
of ‘Carbon Neutral Growth from 2020’, that is no increase of 
international aviation emissions of CO
2
 from 2020 onwards. 
In order to achieve this, the International Civil Aviation 
Organization agreed a global market-based measure, the 
‘Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International 
Aviation’ (CORSIA) at the 39th International Civil Aviation 
Organization Assembly (Resolution A39-3) in 2016. The 
Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International 
Aviation relies on emissions offsetting and work is currently 
ongoing on agreeing a monitoring, reporting and verification 
system and defining the emissions units and registries to be 
used. In addition, the International Civil Aviation Organization 
is working on implementing technical measures to increase 
efficiency or the use of sustainably sourced low-carbon fuels 
to also contribute to the target of ‘Carbon Neutral Growth 
from 2020’.
As of 2015, total emissions of aviation CO
2
 are estimated 
to be of the order of 0.9 GtCO
2
e (International Energy 
Agency data)9, around 62 percent of which are international. 
Domestic emissions fall under the reporting and reduction 
plans of States. International aviation emissions are 
expected to grow from 0.5 GtCO
2
e in 2017 to around 
1.1 GtCO
2
e in 2030 with increasing traffic demand over 
the coming decades, despite emission reductions from 
operational improvements, aircraft technology and 
utilization of sustainable alternative fuels. If growth after 
2020 is compensated by offsets, emissions of the order of 
0.3 GtCO
2
e/year in 2030 could be saved over the reference 
development. This is consistent with the International Civil 
Aviation Organization’s own estimate10.
 
Given that participation in the first phases of the Carbon 
Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International 
Aviation is voluntary, that certain developing countries 
are permanently exempt, and that its actual effectiveness 
depends on its implementation by States, the impact of the 
Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International 
Aviation is still uncertain. So far, around 70 States have 
declared their commitment to join the Carbon Offsetting 
and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation.
 
9 Here, aviation CO
2
e emissions are effectively CO
2
 emissions alone, the sector 
having no significant emissions of methane, Nitrous Oxide (N
2
O) etc. Aviation 
does have non-CO
2
 impacts, however, from emissions of particles, Nitrogen 
Oxides (NOx) and water vapour that impact on Ozone (O
3
), reduce methane, 
and affect cloudiness but these are not estimated in CO
2
e since the scientific 
uncertainty of doing so in terms of Global Warming Potential100 is still rather 
large (Fuglestvedt et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2010).
10 https://www.icao.int/environmental-protection/Pages/A39_CORSIA_FAQ3.
aspx estimates range from 0.288-0.376 GtCO
2
 per year in 2030.
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Whether the offsetting under the Carbon Offsetting and 
Reduction Scheme for International Aviation reduces the 
emissions gap (between the NDCs and what is needed 
for the Paris Agreement long-term goals) also depends 
on the quality of the offsets that are allowed under the 
Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International 
Aviation regime. The gap (as defined in this report) would 
be narrowed if only offsets that reduce emissions beyond 
the NDC of the country that was selling the offsets were 
allowed. The gap would not be narrowed if credits were 
allowed that were already counted towards meeting the 
countries’ NDCs. This would be the case, for example, for 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects initiated 
several years ago that keep operating regardless of whether 
or not the Clean Development Mechanism credits are sold, 
and whose reductions are included in the current emission 
trajectory of the country selling the offsets (Schneider et al., 
2017). Whether the offsetting under the Carbon Offsetting 
and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation reduces 
the emissions gap also depends on the level of participation. 
Hence, the International Civil Aviation Organization 
Agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from 
aviation may have an impact of between 0 and 0.3 GtCO
2
e 
on closing the emissions gap in 2030.
3.4 Understanding the current emission 
trends of G20 members
3.4.1 A comparison of current emission trends of 
G20 members
This section presents a comparison of country-specific 
findings for the G20 members. To assess these, figure 3.3 
shows the projected impact up to 2030 of the NDCs and 
current policies on greenhouse gas emissions for each G20 
member. As mentioned in Chapter 2, these economies 
collectively generate around three quarters of global 
greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore their success in 
implementing (or exceeding) their NDCs will have a major 
impact on the achievement of global climate goals. 
NDCs are not static or one-off commitments; countries have 
the obligation to strengthen them regularly. The assessment 
conducted in this section is on current NDCs, acknowledging 
that they can be revised in the future. 
For each of the G20 members, median emission projections 
resulting from the current policies and full implementation of 
the NDCs is calculated. As described in box 2.2 in Chapter 2, 
current policies projections from independent analyses 
presented in Chapter 2 cover the main energy and climate 
policies implemented as of a recent cut-off date and do 
not consider prospective policies that are being debated or 
planned.
The calculation is based on the same data as the 2016 
Emissions Gap Report was (UNEP, 2016), but updates have 
been used for: the current policies and the NDC projections 
from the Climate Action Tracker (CAT, 2017); the International 
Energy Agency (IEA, 2016); the Joint Research Centre (Kitous 
et al., 2017); PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment 
Agency (den Elzen et al., 2016a; Kuramochi et al., 2016; PBL, 
2017); updated NDC projections from Climate Interactive 
(2017); and some updated national and official studies 
(Reputex, 2016; Sha et al., 2017) (see Appendix A available 
online). More specifically, the data is sourced from: (i) the 
official estimates included in the NDCs (UNFCCC, 2015a); (ii) 
calculations based on the NDCs and on other documents 
submitted by countries to the UNFCCC (such as national 
greenhouse gas inventories, national communications, 
biennial reports, and biennial update reports); (iii) 
estimates published in country-specific studies; and (iv) 
eight independent global analyses11. These are described in 
further detail in Appendix A, which is available online.
The results of this assessment are presented for all G20 
members in figure 3.3 (with the 28 European Union members 
represented collectively instead of by the four Member 
States, who are individual G20 members), noting that data 
are not available for all countries for all studies. By comparing 
the current policy scenarios and the NDC scenarios, the 
figure provides an indication of whether or not a country 
needs to implement policies additional to the current policy 
trajectory to meet its NDC target. The figure does not indicate 
the level of ambition of the NDC targets. Box 3.3 considers 
possible principles for assessing and comparing the ambition 
of NDCs across countries. It is also important to note that the 
current policy trajectory scenarios, which attempt to reflect 
the most recent mitigation policies, differ from the baseline 
or ‘business as usual’ (BAU) scenarios employed by some 
countries, which typically assume that no new policies are 
adopted or implemented after a given cut-off year.
11 The UNFCCC synthesis report and the Danish Energy Agency (DEA) study are 
excluded here, as these studies do not provide national estimates. 
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Figure 3.3 shows that for many countries the implementation 
of their NDC would lead to lower emissions than the current 
policies scenario, or in other words that additional policies 
would have to be implemented to meet the NDC target. 
For some countries the NDC is above the current policies 
scenario, indicating that it should be possible to enhance 
ambition quite easily. For eight G20 members, the NDC is 
above 2010 emission levels. 
Recent studies suggest that Brazil, China, India and Russia 
are likely to – or are roughly on track to – (over)achieve 
their (unconditional) 2030 targets through their currently 
implemented policies.
Argentina, Australia, Canada, the European Union, Indonesia, 
Japan, Mexico, South Africa, Republic of Korea and the 
United States of America are likely to require further action 
in order to meet their NDCs, according to government and 
independent estimates. 
From the existing studies, it is not possible to determine 
whether Saudi Arabia and Turkey are on track to meet their 
NDCs.
Figure 3.3 furthermore illustrates that the progress on 
cutting down greenhouse gas emissions varies across the 
G20 countries. For 11 of the 16 G20 members (counting the 
28 European Union members as one), emission projections 
based on current policies are higher than their 2010 emission 
levels. More specifically, for some non-OECD Member States 
(Argentina, China, India and Saudi Arabia) as well as for 
some OECD Member States (Australia, Mexico, Republic of 
Korea and Turkey), currently implemented policies do not 
stop annual emissions from increasing until 2030. Annual 
emissions in other countries are projected to remain stable 
at about 2010 levels (including in Canada, Russia and the 
United States of America), or to decrease further (such as in 
the European Union with a 7–32 percent reduction compared 
to 2010 levels), under current policies. The following section 
provides more detail on each of the G20 members.
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Figure 3.3: Greenhouse gas emissions (all gases and sectors) of the G20 members by 2030. 
Figure 3.3 a
Note: Greenhouse gas emissions (all gases and sectors) of the G20 members by 2030 for the BAU emissions projection from the NDC submission (third bar), for 
the current policies scenario from official and national studies (fourth bar), from all studies, including official, national and global model studies (fifth bar), for the 
unconditional NDC scenario (sixth bar), and for the conditional NDC scenario (seventh bar). For current-policy and NDC scenarios respectively, the minimum–maximum 
and 10th–90th-percentile range across all assessed studies are provided. The uncertainty ranges are explained in the main text. For reporting reasons, the emissions 
projections for China, European Union, India and United States of America are shown in panel (a), and the other countries in panel (b), with different vertical axis. The 
figure also shows the number of studies underlying the estimate (if available) for the last four bars: current policies (national studies), current policies (all studies) and 
the unconditional NDC and conditional NDC (all studies). 
* For the US, the unconditional NDC is for 2025.
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** South Africa’s INDC is based on an emissions trajectory with an emissions range of 398–614 MtCO
2
e including LULUCF over the period 2025-2030.
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3.4.2 NDCs and emission trends of individual G20 
members
China’s NDC includes four major targets: (1) an intention 
to peak CO
2
 emissions around 2030, making best efforts 
to peak earlier, (2) to reduce the carbon intensity of Gross 
Domestic Product by 60–65 percent from 2005 levels by 
2030, (3) to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary 
energy consumption to around 20 percent by 2030, and (4) 
to increase the forest stock volume by around 4.5 billion m3 
from 2005 levels by 2030. For the first two targets, the NDC 
does not clarify which sectors are covered (Damassa et al., 
2015). Recent independent studies (Climate Action Tracker, 
2017a; den Elzen et al., 2016b; IEA, 2016; Sha et al., 2015) 
12  www.climatepolicydatabase.org, https://newclimate.org/2015/12/01/good-
practice-policies/
When countries put forward their NDCs for the Paris Agreement, they were asked to explain why these are ambitious. 
These explanations can be used to derive metrics to compare countries’ actions. 
The literature on assessing the ambition of NDCs is growing. It compares different energy and climate indicators 
between countries and analyses what would be necessary in terms of national ambition to be compatible with the Paris 
Agreement (Aldy et al., 2016; Climate Transparency, 2017; Höhne et al., 2017). Höhne et al. (2017) argue that only a 
comprehensive approach that covers all perspectives can be used to assess the ambition of national climate policy. Many 
principles could be used by countries to assess ambition, including (based on Höhne et al. 2017):
• A country’s reduction of emissions since 1990 (or any other base-year): the standard perspective for developed 
countries used since 1992, also used in the Kyoto Protocol – the metric used by the European Union, for example.
• Change in recent trend in emissions: a country would do more than before – the main argument in the proposal by 
the United States of America. This can also be measured as a deviation from a BAU scenario. 
• Time and level of peaking emissions per capita: countries go through different levels of development with first rising, 
then peaking and then declining emissions – the metric chosen by China.
• Comparison with equity-based effort-sharing calculations: There is a long history of scientific studies that use ‘effort-
sharing’ principles to calculate ‘fair’ emission targets for countries. The principles include responsibility (for example 
those who emitted more in the past now have to reduce more) or capability (for example those with higher per capita 
income levels should do more), equality (that is equal emission rights per capita), cost-effectiveness (total abatement 
cost per Gross Domestic Product), as well as combinations.
• Comparison with benchmarks of decarbonization indicators: A number of indicators can be used to describe 
countries’ circumstances and developments, for example at the national level, emissions per Gross Domestic Product, 
emissions per capita, energy use per capita or the energy mix. At the sectoral level it could be emissions per kilometre 
travelled or per tonne of cement or steel produced. Indicators can measure activity (for example vehicle kilometres 
travelled) or intensity (emissions per vehicle kilometre) (see also the data portal of the Climate Action Tracker).
• In line with globally cost-effective model pathways: Modelling exercises can identify the country reductions required 
to minimize the aggregated global costs of emission reductions. As a result, reductions are required in those sectors 
and countries where they are least-cost from a global perspective.
• Comparison with best practice policy package or policy menu: A comparison can be made on the extent to which 
a country has implemented supporting policies, addresses barriers, or has counterproductive policies in place. A 
contribution can be regarded as ambitious if it includes many policies that are considered good practice, while it would 
be less ambitious if the country were not to implement the policies that most of its peers had already successfully 
implemented (see also climate policy database12, Climate Transparency 2017).
Comprehensive studies that evaluate diverse metrics are not yet available. However, their inclusion would be very 
useful in future Emissions Gap Reports, as well as for the further processes under the UNFCCC, including the Facilitative 
Dialogue in 2018 and the global stocktake in 2023.
Box 3.3 Comparing the ambition of countries’ NDCs 
suggest that China’s emissions under currently implemented 
policies would roughly be in line with what the NDC targets 
would mean for overall emissions, but do not provide strong 
indication that CO
2
 emissions would peak before 203013. Total 
greenhouse gas emissions are projected to keep on growing 
up to 2030, albeit at a much lower rate than previously 
observed, which is also concluded in the analysis of Jiang et 
al. (2017). Several studies have revised their projection for 
2030 downward compared to last year’s projection.
 
Driven by air pollution control action policies (State Council, 
2013), China started to control coal use and promote clean 
energy use in 2012. Together with economic structural 
13 Some analysts have argued that structural shifts in the economy in recent 
years make likely much steeper reductions in the CO
2
 intensity of Gross 
Domestic Product. Fergus and Stern (2017) include an illustrative pathway 
wherein intensity is halved from 2005 to 2020, and the result is a peak in CO
2
 
emissions between 2020 and 2025.
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changes, this resulted in a slowdown of most energy-
intensive production, a peak in coal consumption in 2013 in 
physical unit and in 2014 in standard coal equivalents, and 
continued decline from 2014. Coal consumption reduced by 
4.7 percent in 2015, and 3.7 percent in 2016 (China Statistic 
Year Book, 2017). Due to the increase in natural gas and 
petroleum production, the total CO
2
 emissions have started 
to decline after 2014. Based on the energy use data, energy 
related CO
2
 emissions are around 450 MtCO
2
 lower in 2016 
than in 2014, which amounts to 5 percent of total CO
2
 
emissions from energy activities. Despite a small increase in 
emissions from clinker manufacture, CO
2
 emissions in 2016 
are still 430 MtCO
2
/year lower than in 2015 (China Statistic 
Year Book, 2017). 
In the last two years, newly installed capacity on wind power, 
solar power, and hydropower has increased to more than 
120 GW, which together with 11 GW newly installed capacity 
for nuclear has dominated the global newly installed capacity 
for low-carbon power. Low-carbon power accounts for more 
than 40 percent of global newly installed capacity in the last 
two years (CEC, 2017; REN21, 2017). 
Due to structural change in the industry sector, energy 
demand increase is projected to be quite low, with energy 
demand by 2020 much lower than that projected in 
government planning. Based on scenario analysis, the 
increase in energy demand in the near future could be 
provided by renewable energy, nuclear and natural gas. 
Given the recent trends, coal decline could continue. Taking 
into account these recent developments, CO
2
 emissions 
may already have peaked, or may not increase in the future 
(Green and Stern, 2017), a development that is not yet 
included in the studies cited above and may be visible in 
future Emissions Gap Reports.
Meanwhile, the European Union’s NDC contains a 
commitment of a 40 percent reduction in domestic 
emissions by 2030 compared to 1990. Recent independent 
studies (CAT, 2017; Kitous et al., 2016) and the European 
Environment Agency (EEA) Trends report (EEA, 2016) suggest 
that the European Union will fall slightly short of its NDC 
target under existing policies.
India’s NDC commits to, by 2030, reduce its emissions 
intensity of Gross Domestic Product by 33–35 percent below 
2005 levels, increase the share of non-fossil energy in total 
power generation capacity to 40 percent, and create an 
additional cumulative carbon sink of 2.5–3 GtCO
2
e through 
additional forest and tree cover. In figure 3.3, unconditional 
NDCs assume either current policies or only the intensity 
target, while conditional NDCs assume full implementation 
of the NDC, including the non-fossil fuel target. Independent 
studies project that the emission level under the intensity 
target would be overachieved, but it is uncertain what 
emission level would be reached under all three targets 
combined (Climate Action Tracker, 2017a; Mitra et al., 
2017; PBL, 2017). Recent policy developments include the 
Draft Electricity Plan published in December 2016 (Central 
Electricity Authority, 2016). Although this is currently not 
an official policy and is in a draft stage, the analysis in the 
document forecasts that no new coal-fired power capacity 
would be required during the period 2022–2027, in contrast 
to around 50 GW of additional capacity expected for the 
period 2017–2022 (Central Electricity Authority, 2016). As a 
result, the share of renewables in total installed capacity in 
this scenario is projected to increase to around 43 percent 
in 2027 (Central Electricity Authority, 2016). Overall, the 
assessment suggests that the positive development provides 
ample room for India to strengthen its NDC.
The INDC communicated by the United States of America in 
2015 indicated an intent to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
by between 26 and 28 percent below 2005 levels in 2025, 
which translates to 4.6-4.8 GtCO
2
e/year (national estimate, 
in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) Global Warming 
Potential terms). In June 2017, President Donald Trump 
announced that the United States of America intended 
to withdraw from the Paris Agreement and would cease 
implementation of the NDC. The United States of America 
subsequently communicated its intent to the United Nations 
Secretary-General (The Representative of the United States 
of America to the United Nations, 2017). The earliest that 
United States of America withdrawal can take effect is in 
2020, four years after the Paris Agreement entered into 
force. Seven studies to date estimate that 2025 emissions 
under the new Administration’s policies will range from 
5.7-6.8 GtCO
2
e/year, in contrast to 5.0-6.6 GtCO
2
e/year 
under the previous Administration’s policies (Chai et al., 
2017; Climate Action Tracker, 2017a; Climate Advisers, 2017; 
ClimateInteractive, 2017; Hafstead, 2017; Rhodium Group, 
2017a, b). The impact of current and upcoming action by 
subnational and non-state actors may also be significant 
(Kuramochi et al., 2017).
Argentina presented a revised NDC at the COP 22 in 
November 2016 (Government of Argentina, 2016). This new 
NDC includes an unconditional absolute emissions target 
of 483 MtCO
2
e/year by 2030 and a conditional target of 
369 MtCO
2
e by 2030, both including LULUCF. The revised 
NDC is significantly more ambitious than the previous one in 
terms of absolute emissions (about 190 MtCO
2
e/year lower 
for the unconditional target), which is partially attributable 
to the revised methodology for quantifying the historical 
emissions data. The Climate Action Tracker concludes in its 
latest analysis (Climate Action Tracker, 2017b) that the 2030 
emissions projections, previously assessed to be on track 
to meet the unconditional target (Kuramochi et al., 2016), 
would not reach the revised NDC targets. 
Australia committed to a 26–28 percent reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 below 2005 levels, 
including LULUCF. Government projections indicate that 
emissions are expected to reach 592 MtCO
2
e/year in 2030 
(Government of Australia, 2016), in contrast to the targeted 
range of 429-440 MtCO
2
e/year. Independent analyses 
(Kuramochi et al., 2016; Reputex, 2016) confirm that the 
emissions are set to far exceed its Paris Agreement NDC 
target for 2030. The Emissions Reduction Fund, which 
the Government of Australia considers to be a key policy 
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2017) agree that Mexico will fall short of its unconditional 
NDC target (759 MtCO
2
e/year) by 20–160 MtCO
2
/year under 
its current policies.
The Republic of Korea committed under its NDC to reduce 
its greenhouse gas emissions by 37 percent below BAU by 
2030. Recent independent analyses (CAT, 2017; PBL, 2017) 
indicated that the emissions projections under current 
policies would fall short of the NDC emission level. However, 
it should be noted that the new President Moon Jae-in 
recently announced that the Republic of Korea will reduce 
its dependency on coal-fired and nuclear power generation 
(Cheong Wa Dae, 2017; MOTIE-MOE-MOLIT, 2017), while 
increasing renewable electricity. No official government 
document has been published.
 
Russia’s INDC aims to limit its greenhouse gas emissions 
to 70–75 percent of 1990 levels by 2030. Independent 
estimates on the INDC emission level vary significantly 
(2.4–2.7 GtCO
2
e/year including LULUCF), mainly due to 
different interpretations on the accounting of LULUCF 
emissions (Government of Russia, 2014). The emission 
levels under current policies projected by independent 
analyses are approximately 2.0–2.4 GtCO
2
e/year (including 
LULUCF) in 2030 and reach the lower end of Russia’s INDC 
range (Kuramochi et al., 2016). The latest current policies 
projections for 2030 excluding LULUCF by the Climate Action 
Tracker (Climate Action Tracker, 2017d) have been revised 
downward by 0.2–0.3 GtCO
2
e/year compared to the 2016 
assessment. Our assessment suggests that there is ample 
room for Russia to strengthen its NDC.
Saudi Arabia’s NDC aims to achieve mitigation co-benefits of 
up to 130 MtCO
2
e avoided annually by 2030 through actions 
and plans outlined to contribute to economic diversification 
and adaptation. The country has not yet defined a baseline, 
which the NDC states will be determined based on 
differently weighted combinations of two scenarios, which 
differ in terms of their assumptions on the allocation of oil: 
produced for either domestic consumption or export. Among 
independent studies, PBL Netherlands Environmental 
Assessment Agency and the European Commission’s Joint 
Research Centre  project that Saudi Arabia will achieve its 
NDC (Kitous et al., 2017), whereas Climate Action Tracker 
projects it to miss the NDC target (Climate Action Tracker, 
2017e).
South Africa’s NDC consists of a peak, plateau and decline 
in the greenhouse gas emissions trajectory range, which 
gives a range of 398–614 MtCO
2
e/year between 2025 and 
2030, reaching a peak between 2020 and 2025 and a plateau 
for the following decade, before starting to fall. All studies 
(Climate Action Tracker, 2017f; Kitous et al., 2017; PBL, 2017) 
agree that South Africa will not achieve its NDC range under 
current policies by a margin of 50 MtCO
2
e/year to nearly 
400 MtCO
2
e/year in 2030.  
Turkey’s NDC sets an economy-wide greenhouse gas 
emission reduction target of up to 21 percent below BAU 
in 2030. Among independent studies, PBL Netherlands 
measure to reduce emissions alongside other measures 
such as the National Energy Productivity Plan and targets for 
the reduction of hydrofluorocarbons (85 percent by 2036), 
does not set Australia on a path to meeting its targets.
Brazil has put forward an absolute emissions reduction 
target, committing to reduce emissions to 1.3 GtCO
2
e/year 
by 2025 and 1.2 GtCO
2
e/year by 2030, which is equivalent 
to 37 percent and 43 percent below 2005 emissions levels 
including LULUCF. Recent independent studies suggest 
current policy projections to be in line with the NDC targets 
(CAT, 2017; Kuramochi et al., 2016; PBL, 2017). Uncertainty 
nevertheless remains about the future of emissions growth; 
for example, the LULUCF emissions reduced by 86 percent 
between 2005 and 2012 (Ministry of Science and Technology 
of Brazil, 2016), but recent data and analyses suggest that 
the decreasing trend on deforestation and the resulting 
emissions reductions have slowed down or even stopped 
(SEEG, 2017). 
Canada’s NDC commits to emissions reductions of 30 percent 
from the 2005 level by 2030. Government projections indicate 
that emissions are expected to reach 742 MtCO
2
e/year 
in 2030, in contrast to the targeted level of 523 MtCO
2
e/year 
(excluding LULUCF) (Environment and Climate Change 
Canada, 2017). Independent studies (Climate Action Tracker, 
2017h; PBL, 2017) also agree that Canada will miss its NDC 
target under current policies by a large margin (610–820 
MtCO
2
e/year compared to the NDC target of 510–580 
MtCO
2
e/year in 2030).
Indonesia’s NDC includes an unconditional target of 
29 percent below BAU and a conditional 41 percent 
reduction below BAU with sufficient international support 
by 2030, both including LULUCF. The NDC includes emissions 
due to deforestation and peat land destruction, which are 
the country’s largest sources of greenhouse gas emissions. 
Studies covered in figure 3.3 show that Indonesia is close to 
being on track to achieving its unconditional NDC, which is 
based on new independent analyses (CAT, 2017; Kuramochi 
et al., 2016; PBL, 2017) that show a range of emission 
projections under current policies for 2030, although the 
upper end of the projection range is not expected to achieve 
the unconditional NDC target.
Japan aims to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 
26 percent below 2013 levels by 2030 under its NDC. Recent 
analyses (CAT, 2017; PBL, 2017) show that the target could 
possibly be reached with currently implemented policies, 
although there is still a great deal of uncertainty regarding 
the future role of nuclear and coal power. It is worth noting 
that the government has started the process to formulate a 
new Basic Energy Plan, in which a revised future electricity 
mix target for 2030 and subsequent years would be laid out. 
Mexico aims, in its NDC, to reduce its greenhouse gas 
emissions by between 22 percent (unconditional) and 
36 percent (conditional) from BAU by 2030. Under its current 
policies, Mexico is not on track to meet its NDC target. 
Independent studies (Climate Action Tracker, 2017c; PBL, 
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Figure 3.4: Illustration of the potential impact of international cooperative initiatives in 2030.
Environmental Assessment Agency and the European 
Commission’s Joint Research Centre project that Turkey will 
overachieve its NDC considerably by 370–410 MtCO
2
e/year 
(Kitous et al., 2017; PBL, 2017; van Vuuren et al., 2017; 
Vandyck et al., 2016) while Climate Action Tracker projects it 
to miss the NDC target, based on the government projection 
(Climate Action Tracker, 2017g).
3.5 Subnational and non-state actions to 
narrow the gap
In line with previous Emissions Gap Reports, this report finds 
that subnational and non-state actions could possibly make 
a significant contribution to narrowing the gap (figure 3.4). 
The aggregate impact of the initiatives could be in the order 
of a few GtCO
2
e in 2030 beyond the current NDCs, if the 
initiatives reach their stated goals and if these reductions do 
not displace actions elsewhere. Since the 2016 report, only 
updates on earlier studies (Compact of Mayors 2015; CDP 
and We Mean Business, 2016; The Climate Group, 2016; 
Graichen et al., 2017), but no significantly new aggregation 
reports, have become available.
Analysis of the extent to which individual subnational and 
non-state actors or initiatives meet their stated objectives 
is still scarce. Chan et al. (2016) find that not all initiatives 
deliver on their promises. Graichen et al. (2017) provide a 
preliminary assessment of the actual emission reductions 
of an initiative compared to its potential. Based on such 
analysis, several studies (Graichen et al., 2016; Michaelowa 
and Michaelowa, 2017) have identified criteria for initiatives 
to be effective:
• Permanent funding and secretarial support
•  Inclusion of Non-Govermental Organizations in the 
design and implementation of the initiative
• Definition of mitigation targets including baseline
• Regular monitoring, reporting and verification
The process around and following the COP 21 in Paris in 
2015 has brought about much higher recognition and 
institutionalization of the role of non-state actors in the 
intergovernmental climate change process. This process 
continued at COP 22 in Marrakech in 2016, where the 
Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action was 
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launched14. It provides guidance on how the UNFCCC process 
will catalyse and support climate action by Parties and 
non-Party stakeholders in the period up to 2020, in line with 
the arrangements of the Paris Agreement. It also promotes 
an assessment of the compatibility of commitments with 
regard to the long-term objectives of the Paris Agreement, 
and seeks to increase the coherence with the Sustainable 
Development Goals.
 
A number of new cooperative initiatives involving non-state 
actors were launched at COP 22 in Marrakech. The ‘2050 
Pathways’ platform intends to build a bridge to long-term 
decarbonization scenarios and strategies and brings together 
both state and non-state actors15. The Global South was 
well represented in new initiatives such as the Marrakech 
Investment Committee for Adaptation Fund, the Initiative 
for Renewable Island Energy and the Marrakech Pledge for 
Fostering Green Capital Markets in Africa. A host of other 
initiatives were launched in various areas, including forests, 
water, energy, human settlements, oceans, transport and 
agriculture16. However, there was little information on the 
progress regarding the non-state initiatives launched in Paris.
The number of non-state commitments and actions included 
in the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action17 platform, 
where the UNFCCC captures and recognizes climate 
commitments from non-state actors, continued to grow 
to over 12,000 (mostly individual) commitments in 2016, 
compared to 10,000 in 2015. The Non-State Actor Zone for 
Climate Action also aims to assess the progress in these 
commitments, but so far there is little data available. UN 
Environment’s Climate Initiatives Platform18, which provides 
the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action with data on 
important cooperative non-state climate initiatives, has also 
started collecting this information.
14 http://unfccc.int/files/paris_agreement/application/pdf/marrakech_
partnership_for_global_climate_action.pdf
15 http://newsroom.unfccc.int/unfccc-newsroom/high-level-climate-
champions-launch-2050-pathways-platform/
16 http://newsroom.unfccc.int/climate-action/non-state-actors-partner-with-
governments-to-boost-climate-action/ 
17 http://climateaction.unfccc.int/
18 http://climateinitiativesplatform.org/
Actions by subnational and non-state actors have the 
potential to reinforce each other (Andonova et al., 2017) and 
could make the Paris Agreement more robust. Even if Parties 
announce the withdrawal of their support from implementing 
the Paris Agreement, other actors in the same country could 
step in to reaffirm their commitment. For example, following 
the announcement of the Trump Administration to withdraw 
from the Paris Agreement, the United States of America has 
seen a number of new initiatives driven by subnational and 
non-state actors, such as America’s Pledge on Climate19, We 
Are Still In20, Climate Mayors21 and the US Climate Alliance22. 
If backed by action, these initiatives have the potential to 
make up for the withdrawal (Kuramochi et al., 2017).
Jerry Brown, governor of California, announced23 in July 
2017 that the State of California will convene representatives 
from subnational governments, businesses, investors and 
civil society in San Francisco, California, in September 2018 
for a Global Climate Action Summit24. The meeting aims 
to demonstrate the groundswell of innovative, ambitious 
climate action, highlight the economic and environmental 
transition already under way and spur deeper commitment 
from all parties, including national governments.
19 https://www.americaspledgeonclimate.com
20 http://www.wearestillin.com
21 http://www.climatemayors.org
22 https://www.usclimatealliance.org
23 https://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=19866
24 https://globalclimateactionsummit.org/
